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POLICY CHALLENGE
The European Commission relies increasingly on commitment decisions.
More transparency on the substance of allegations, and the establishment
of a higher number of legal precedents, are however necessary. This
applies in particular to cases that tackle antitrust issues in new areas,
such as markets for digital goods, in which companies might find it diffi-
cult to assess if a certain behaviour constitutes a violation of competition
rules. To ensure greater
transparency and mitigate
some of the drawbacks of
commitment decisions,
while retaining their main
benefits, the full detail of
the objections addressed
by the European Commis-
sion to defendants should
be published.
Steps in European Commission antitrust procedures
THE ISSUE Excluding cartels, most investigations into suspected infringe-
ments of European Union competition law are resolved with ‘commitment
decisions’. The European Commission drops the case in exchange for a
commitment from the company under investigation to implement meas-
ures to stop the presumed anti-competitive behaviour. Commitment
decisions are considered speedier than formal sanctions (prohibition deci-
sions) in restoring normal competitive market conditions. They have a cost,
however: commitments are voluntary and are unlikely to be subject to judi-
cial review. This reduces the European Commission’s incentive to build a
robust case. Because commitment decisions do not establish any legal
precedent, they provide for little guidance on the interpretation of the law. 
Source: Bruegel.
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1. We examine cases
involving anti-competi-
tive agreements
(prohibited by Article
101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union), excluding
cartels, and abuse-of-
dominance (Article
102). Cartels are sub-
ject to different
procedures, entail fines
and do not pose the
same dilemmas as
other antitrust
offences, because set-
tling companies are
formally sanctioned.
2. Source: European
Commission commit-
ment decisions (29)
and prohibition deci-
sions (18). Other types
of decision are
excluded.
3. Council Regulation
No 1/2003 of 16
December 2002. The
Regulation entered into
force on 1 May 2004.
4. See Alexander Ital-
ianer, Director General
of the European Com-
mission’s Competition
Directorate-General,
speech of 11 December
2013 at the CRA Com-
petition Conference,
available at
http://ec.europa.eu/compe
tition/speeches/text/sp20
13_11_en.pdf.
EXCLUDING CARTELS1, 62 percent
(29 out of 47) of European Com-
mission antitrust decisions from
May 2004 to December 2013 did
not formally sanction an antitrust
violation2. After a first assessment
of the case, the Commission con-
fronts the companies suspected
of infringing the rules with its pre-
liminary findings. The
investigation may then continue
and result in a prohibition deci-
sion, which compels the
company to stop its abusive
behaviour and pay a potentially
hefty fine. Most notably, the
Microsoft I and Intel cases
resulted in prohibition decisions.
Alternatively, the company can
offer to stop its behaviour and
make a number of commitments.
If those commitments address
the Commission’s preliminary
concerns, the Commission might
make those commitments bind-
ing and stop its investigation with
no further consequences for the
companies involved, which admit
no wrongdoing.
Commitment decisions have been
common for the majority of
antitrust cases investigated in the
last decade. Of abuse-of-domi-
nance cases, which are prohibited
under Article 102 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), 75 percent (18 out
of 24) were resolved with commit-
ment decisions. Under the current
competition commissioner
Joaquín Almunia, only one Article
102 prohibition decision was
taken, compared to 10 commit-
ment decisions. Figure 1 shows
the trend in decisions since May
2004, when commitment deci-
sions were formally introduced in
European Union regulation3.
Commitment decisions are often
used to respond rapidly to abuses
that are causing significant harm
to consumers and risk hampering
the development of a market if not
quickly stopped. However, com-
mitment decisions come at cost:
they are based on a preliminary
assessment of the concerns and
they do not formally identify any
infringement. Since the compa-
nies involved admit no
wrongdoing and the decision is
very unlikely to be challenged in
court, the European Commission
publishes very little information
about its theory of harm in the
commitment decision. Indeed,
this is implicitly part of the deal:
the absence of a clear identifica-
tion of the concerns minimises
the risk of private actions for dam-
ages against the companies, and
it also limits the Commission’s
exposure to potential external
criticism.
Commitment decisions, therefore,
offer little guidance to the market
on how similar scenarios might be
assessed by the Commission in
the future. Problems might be
temporarily solved, but there is
little guarantee that they will not
re-emerge in the long term.
Commitment decisions treat the
symptoms but do not cure the
illness. 
The Commission seems to be
aware of this trade-off. It has said
that prohibition decisions are
made whenever there is a signifi-
cant need for ‘deterrence,
punishment and legal
precedent’4. However, this claim is
not fully supported by the facts.
Few prohibition decisions have
been adopted in novel areas of
intervention for which legal guid-
ance is much needed. This can be
most clearly seen in cases of
patent abuse in standard setting,
notoriously a difficult area of
intervention for antitrust. These
cases concern how the adoption
of a standard can enable holders
of essential patents to extract
unfair rents from licensees of the
standardised technology (see
Mariniello, 2013, for an analysis).
This involves the interpretation of
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Blue bars = commitment decisions (dark blue: Art. 101, light blue: Art. 102)
Red bars = prohibition decisions (dark red: Art. 101, light red: Art. 102)
Source: Bruegel based on DG Competition case search tool. Note: * excluding cartels.
Article 101 TFEU prohibits anti-competitive agreements, Article 102 TFEU prohibits
abuse of dominance. See footnote 1.
Figure 1: European Commission antitrust decisions* (May 2004 – Dec 2013)
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5. Case information can
be retrieved at
http://ec.europa.eu/com
peti-
tion/elojade/isef/index.
cfm.
6. Samsung submitted
its commitment pro-
posal to the
Commission in Septem-
ber 2013; Google
already settled a pro-
ceeding in the United
States for behaviour
similar to that alleged
by the Commission. See
http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2
013/07/ftc-finalizes-set-
tlement-google-motorola-
mobility-case.
7. To make a simple
comparison, the com-
mitment decision in
Rambus is 17 pages
long, four of which are
dedicated to the 'Prac-
tices raising concerns'.
The Intel prohibition is
518 pages long, with
225 pages dedicated to
an analysis of how Intel
has abused its domi-
nant position.
8. Google has already
submitted three com-
mitment proposals to
the Commission in the
course of proceedings
for alleged abuse of its
search engine.
9. The new procedure
was inspired by the US,
where settlements
have a long tradition
and represent the most
common scenario (see
Georgiev, 2007).
concepts such as ‘fairness’ and
‘reasonableness,’ which is
particularly tricky in antitrust and
on which no consensus exists
amongst scholars. Yet, after
seven years of investigations
(including topical cases, such as
Rambus, Qualcomm and IPCom5)
the Commission has not adopted
any decision with precedent
value. The current cases involving
Samsung and Google-Motorola
deal with the very same issues,
but the likelihood that the two
cases will be settled through com-
mitment decisions is high6.
Therefore, no clarification of the
approach of the Commission in
this area is to be expected any
time soon7.
Other areas which would signifi-
cantly benefit from legal guidance
likewise lack strong legal prece-
dents. Commitment decisions
have been taken in the air trans-
port (eg oneworld and Star
cases), energy (eg EON gas
market foreclosure cases) and
new media (eg ebooks case) sec-
tors, to mention a few, although
new tools or novel theories of
harm were underlying the Com-
mission’s reasoning. It is possible
that two of the most significant
and controversial cases recently
investigated by the European
Commission, Google (search
engine case) and Gazprom, will
also be settled through commit-
ment decisions8.
In this Policy Brief, I describe the
institutional background behind
commitment and prohibition deci-
sions, discuss benefits and costs
for each form of decision and
report figures on decisions in the
last nine years of antitrust
enforcement in the EU. I conclude
by proposing an amendment to
the current regulation that would
increase transparency in commit-
ment decisions.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
A specific procedure for commit-
ment decisions was formally
introduced a decade ago by Coun-
cil Regulation 1/2003 in the
context of the modernisation of
EU antitrust law. Before then, set-
tlements of antitrust proceedings
were few and had an informal and
unstructured nature (the vast
majority of cases resulted in pro-
hibitions with or without a fine)9.
Under the current rules, an inves-
tigation for a suspected breach of
EU competition law might lead to
the adoption of a prohibition deci-
sion10 (see the figure on the front
page for a simple illustration of
the process). That decision identi-
fies the infringement, stops the
anticompetitive behaviour, might
impose remedies and could entail
a fine of up to 10 percent of the
guilty company’s global turnover.
Before taking such a decision, the
Commission must address the
company with its preliminary con-
cerns in a ‘Statement of
Objections’. The company can
then attempt to dispel the con-
cerns by bringing up new
arguments or evidence during the
hearing process. The subsequent
investigation phase might result
in the Commission dropping the
case if new evidence points to no
infringement, although this is
very uncommon11. 
To avoid the adoption of a prohibi-
tion decision, the company under
investigation can instead propose
a set of commitments that, if
deemed to address the concerns
that have been preliminarily iden-
tified can be rendered binding by
the Commission with a decision
pursuant to Article 9 of Council
Regulation 1/2003 (an Article 9
decision). For example, in the IBM
case the Commission was con-
cerned that IBM would supply its
competitors with mainframe com-
puters at an unreasonably high
price. The case was resolved
through an Article 9 decision
under which IBM committed to
make spare parts and technical
information swiftly available at a
fair price to independent main-
frame maintainers.
The Commission has the power to
enforce Article 9 decisions: if the
company is found to not comply
with the commitments, it can be
fined up to 10 percent of its global
turnover12. The commitment deci-
sion can be appealed before the
EU courts, which can question the
proportionality of the commit-
ments or whether the
Commission's assessment was
manifestly incorrect. However, as
companies enter voluntarily into
commitment agreements,
appeals are highly unlikely (Wils,
2008). Kellerbauer (2011) notes
that no appeal has ever been filed
by parties addressed by a com-
mitment decision; very few
appeals were filed by third parties.
THE TRADE-OFF: COMMITMENTS
VERSUS PROHIBITION
From a social welfare perspective
there are two key reasons why
violations of competition laws
should be pursued by antitrust
authorities: (a) to restore and pre-
serve the correct functioning of
the market when competition is
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threatened by harmful behaviour
and (b) to minimise the risk that
similar violations in other markets
would occur in the future. Prohibi-
tion decisions respond to both
requirements. Commitment deci-
sions in most cases respond only
to the first, though they might do
it more efficiently. Table 1 sum-
marises the benefits of both
types of decisions for the Com-
mission and the companies under
investigation.
(a) Protect competition
Prohibition decisions arguably
yield a more accurate identifica-
tion of competition concerns,
since more evidence is collected
after the hearing process. Most
importantly, prohibition decisions
are naturally exposed to ex-post
judicial examination: defendants
can (and often do) appeal deci-
sions before the EU courts. This
places a significant pressure on
the Commission, which could be
censured if its assessment is
deemed wrong by the court. Pro-
hibition decisions therefore
maximise the incentive to accu-
rately identify the concerns and
pinpoint the best solution. Con-
versely, the prospect of a
prohibition decision might lead
the Commission to drop a weak
case, if it believes that it would
not pass the court’s review.
Commitment decisions on the
other hand, come at an earlier
stage in the process, when the
investigation is not yet finalised.
Commitment decisions provide
less of an incentive for accuracy
in the assessment because the
likelihood that an Article 9 deci-
sion will end up in court is close to
zero. Paradoxically, the Commis-
sion might have a greater
incentive to adopt a commitment
decision in cases for which there
might be a greater need to estab-
lish a legal precedent through a
prohibition decision. The more
novel the theory of harm, the
greater the risk of annulment by
the EU courts, and the lower the
attractiveness of prohibition deci-
sions. This risk is well
acknowledged in the literature13.
The key benefit of a commitment
decision is arguably to provide a
quicker response to an ongoing
infringement. An analysis of the
Commission’s decisions generally
confirms this but also suggests
more caution. The time from the
opening of a proceeding to the
adoption of the decision is on
average 17 percent longer for pro-
hibition decisions than
commitment decisions: 28.5
versus 24.3 months. This
changes though if decisions are
categorised according to the
nature of the infringement (Figure
2 on the next page). Commitment
decisions are particularly popular
in abuse of dominance cases
(breaches of Article 102 of the EU
Treaty). However, in these cases,
commitment decisions have
taken on average longer than pro-
hibition decisions: 26 months
10. Articles 7 and 23 of
Council Regulation
1/2003.
11. This has only hap-
pened in four Article
101 cases: SkyTeam,
UK Roaming, Germany
Roaming and iTunes.
12. In March 2013,
Microsoft was the first
company ever fined for
non-compliance of an
art. 9 decision, see
Mariniello (2013) for a
commentary:
http://www.bruegel.org/
nc/blog/detail/article/1
035-microsoft-fined-
for-non-compliance-a-g
ame-changer-in-
antitrust-settlements/.
13. See Wagner Von-
Papp (2012) for
example. On a similar
note, Wils (2008)
warns that antitrust
authorities might be
tempted to offer a set-
tlement with mild
conditions (say, soft
commitments) when
dealing with weak
cases that are more vul-
nerable to judicial
review. The authority
could therefore claim
that the investigation
had a concrete result
without running the risk
of being quashed in
court. Without a soft
settlement being avail-
able, those cases might
instead have been
dropped, because of
the risk of a prohibition
decision being over-
turned in court.
Table 1: The commitment versus prohibition decision trade-off
Antitrust authority Defendant
Objective Maximises consumer surplus Maximises own profits
Benefits of
commitment
decision
Potentially faster procedure – earlier end to
consumer harm;
Reduced administrative costs – greater
efficiency;
Can craft remedies to open markets and
reduce likelihood of future infringements;
Can market-test remedies to better address
the concerns.
Avoid fines;
Defendant can propose remedies;
Stops legal costs and ongoing bad publicity;
Limit risk of action for damages.
Benefits of
prohibition
Deeper assessment – lower likelihood of
errors;
Increase Commission’s accountability
through exposure to judicial review;
Establish a legal precedent – guidance for
future assessments;
Increase deterrence through fines;
Fairness: allow follow-on private action.
New evidence or deeper assessment might
lead to the case being dropped (no prohibition);
Remedies may be less cumbersome than
commitment decisions;
Longer period before prohibition – can still
enjoy illegal profits if any;
Easier access to court for appeal – judicial
review.
Source: Bruegel.
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14. ‘Highly dynamic
sectors’ are defined
based on the Eurostat
grouping ‘High tech
manufacturing or high
tech services and finan-
cial services’.
15. See Choné et al
(2014). Some authors
identify a negative and
significant impact of
investigations on com-
pany share prices (for
example, Langus and
Motta, 2007; Guenster
and Van Dijk, 2011),
whether or not a fine is
levied. The most likely
explanation for this is
that investors suddenly
realise that the current
level of profits is over-
estimated in that it
includes rents resulting
from an illegal behav-
iour which will likely
cease.
16. The E.ON case, for
example:
http://europa.eu/rapid/p
ress-release_IP-10-
494_en.htm.
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decisions identify the infringe-
ment and clarify the application of
competition law. By creating a
legal precedent that can be chal-
lenged before the courts,
prohibition decisions help compa-
nies anticipate how the
Commission will in the future
assess certain behaviours. Prohi-
bition decisions entail significant
costs for infringers, most notably
pecuniary sanctions, but they
also increase expected legal
expenses and the likelihood of
follow-on damage claims by vic-
tims of the infringement.
Prohibition decisions fully
express the dissuasive power of
antitrust action. 
Commitment decisions, by con-
trast, do not sanction any
infringement and include no
admission of wrongdoing by the
investigated companies. The
scant detail reported in decisions
gives little guidance on future
behaviour to companies. More-
over, if the commitments are
limited to stopping the infringe-
ment, they allow companies to
keep the illegal profits from the
period of the infringement. Little
deterrence can therefore come
from commitment decisions15.
Such an effect can be mitigated
by the design of remedies that not
only stop the harmful behaviour
and restore competition, as it is
normally the case in prohibition
decisions; additional remedies
can also be imposed to reduce the
risk of future violations.  Such
‘proactive’ remedies could entail
the opening of the market to
favour entry of new competitors
and to increase competition. For
example, in some past cases in
the energy sector, the Commis-
sion required the dominant
company to divest significant
assets for capacity generation
and favour competitors’ new
investment16. In principle, reme-
dies should be proportionate to
the infringement and therefore
one could expect the remedies
ultimately imposed through com-
mitment and prohibition
decisions to be the same. How-
ever, given the voluntary nature of
the commitments, it would be
more difficult for the committing
party to challenge the decision in
court; this de facto grants more
against 22.7 months. That is:
cases resulting in commitment
decisions have been 15 percent
slower than prohibitions. While
this surprising result could be due
to the lack of statistically signifi-
cant figures (there have been
only six Article 102 prohibition
decisions since May 2004, and it
cannot be excluded that a prohibi-
tion was adopted in those cases
exactly because it was believed
that they would not require a long
investigation), it nevertheless
suggests that the greater speed
normally attributed to commit-
ment decisions is not to be taken
for granted.
Reducing the investigation period
might allow a budget-constrained
antitrust authority to allocate
resources to pursue a greater
number of potentially harmful
cases. Most importantly,
particularly in dynamic industries
(such as ICT), timing can be criti-
cal. A settlement allows quick
identification (albeit preliminary)
of the issue and the introduction
of a correction in the market in
order to restore normal competi-
tion almost immediately. One
should expect, therefore, commit-
ment decisions to be particularly
popular in rapidly evolving sec-
tors. An analysis of the
Commission’s decisions, how-
ever, seems to refute that idea.
Only 24 percent of commitment
decisions since 2004 applied to
highly dynamic sectors com-
pared to 61 percent of prohibition
decisions14.
(b) Ensure deterrence
The second reason for pursuing
violations of competition law is to
deter bad behaviour. Prohibition
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Source: Bruegel based on DG Competition case search tool. Note: The time lag is
defined as the average length (in months) between the date of the opening of pro-
ceedings and the date of the prohibition/commitment decision. Sample period:
commitment and prohibition decisions from May 2004 to December 2013.
Figure 2: Length of European Commission antitrust proceedings
leeway to the Commission to
extract stricter conditions17. From
the Commission's perspective,
proactive remedies can be a
useful tool. Despite the criticism
of proactive remedies in the legal
literature (see Georgiev, 2007, for
example), they might be justifi-
able on economic grounds.
Proactive remedies allow the
Commission to offer the elimina-
tion of a fine in exchange for
remedies that can affect market
structure, increase competition
and therefore potentially lead to
higher welfare levels for con-
sumers.
CONCLUSIONS AND WAY FORWARD
Table 2 indicates that there has
been a significant shift in the
European Commission’s policy
choice of instrument for tackling
antitrust violations. During Mario
Monti's period as competition
commissioner, after the entry into
force of Council Regulation
1/2003, four cases were closed
with a prohibition decision but no
commitment decision was
taken18. Under Neelie Kroes, about
50 percent more commitment
decisions than prohibition deci-
sions were taken. Under current
commissioner Almunia, the ratio
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17. The European Union
Court of Justice has
clearly indicated that
even though the princi-
ple of proportionality of
remedies is valid under
commitment and prohi-
bition procedures, the
application of the prin-
ciple differs depending
of the nature of the pro-
vision. See judgment of
the Court (Grand Cham-
ber), 29 June 2010,
European Commission
v Alrosa Company Ltd.,
C-441/07, paragraph
47.
18. While this might be
because of the back-
load of cases initiated
during the previous
antitrust regime, it
should be noted that
Council Regulation
1/2003 was adopted in
December 2002 and it
was at the time known
that it would enter into
force 17 months later.
19. Almunia said on 8
March 2013: “Why do
we take many Article 9
decisions? One reason
is that we too prefer to
conclude cases swiftly
when this brings the
most benefits to the
markets”. See
http://europa.eu/rapid/p
ress-release_SPEECH-
13-210_en.htm.
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has ramped-up to three commit-
ment decisions for each
prohibition decision. 
This increased use of
commitment decisions is not
necessarily problematic in itself.
As discussed in the previous
section, the choice of one or the
other instrument could well be
justified by the associated
expected benefits19. However,
independently of whether this
policy is based on the correct
premises, the
currently extensive
use of commitment
decisions calls for a
refinement of the
rules governing
them. 
If it is indeed the
case that for most
ongoing investigations, commit-
ment decisions are more suitable
for addressing the Commission’s
concerns, the underlying institu-
tional framework should be
improved to mitigate drawbacks
and retain benefits. Such a refine-
ment would all the more be
needed if commitment decisions
could sometimes be used to avoid
judicial review when the theory of
harm is not solid enough. 
The main drawback of commit-
ment decisions is the absence of
a clear identification of the
antitrust violation. Not only does
this imply that no guidance is pro-
vided to companies, it also
significantly limits the accounta-
bility of antitrust authorities. With
no ex-post legal review, the incen-
tive for accurate and extensive
assessment of the case at hand is
limited.
It is therefore possible that com-
mitment decisions
are taken not only
when there is a
need for a swift
implementation of
the remedies but
also when cases are
discovered to be too
weak to stand up in
court. Cases based
on weaker economic evidence are
likely to be settled on a ‘win-win’
basis: the defendant avoids the
risk of a fine; the Commission
avoids showing up empty handed
after a lengthy investigation or,
worse, taking an incorrect deci-
sion that would be quashed by
the court. This approach however
does not mitigate the harm to a
plethora of losers. Affected con-
sumers and third parties  are
forced to trust the Commission’s
judgement that their concerns
have been resolved, with little
means to double check (they
may appeal the decision but
because they have little informa-
tion on the strength of the
Commission’s arguments, such
appeals are often judged too risky
and not worth the legal costs).
Markets gain nothing, and are no
clearer on the definition of anti-
and pro-competitive behaviours.
More generally, citizens are given
Table 2: European Commission antitrust decisions per commissioner
Commissioner Number of
commitments
Number of
prohibitions
Ratio
(commitments/
prohibitions)
Monti* 0 4 0
Kroes 14 9 1.56
Almunia 15 5 3
Source: Bruegel based on DG Competition case search tool. Note: Cases are attrib-
uted to the commissioner in charge at the time of the commitment decision or
prohibition decision, according to the starting and final date of their mandates:
Monti, from the entry into force of the new regulation for antitrust proceeding in
May 2004 to 30 October 2004; Kroes, 22 November 2004 to 9 February 2010;
Almunia, 9 February 2010 to present. * Decisions under Monti cover a period of
only six months.
‘It is possible that
commitment deci-
sions are taken when
cases are discovered
to be too weak to
stand up in court.’
little information on which to
judge the efficiency of the Com-
mission’s actions.
Currently, commitment decisions
do not spell out the full detail of
the theory of harm that led the
Commission to believe that the
behaviour implemented by the
company is harmful
for consumers. The
substance of allega-
tions is not
examined in depth
and no detailed
description of the
practice leading to
the infringement or
the rationale behind
the remedies is reported (Wagner
Von-Papp, 2012). For decisions
published since May 2004, the
average length of commitment
decisions is 21 pages compared
to 160 for prohibition decisions20.
The key reason why detailed
information is not disclosed in
commitment decisions is that
none of the affected parties has
an interest in doing so. With a
short decision, the companies
avoid disclosing information on
their business, do not provide
information that could trigger
claims for damages and avoid bad
publicity. The Commission avoids
exposing its reasoning to poten-
tial external criticism. Because
there are incentives for minimal
disclosure of information, only a
change in the law can foster
transparency.
A fundamental refinement of the
institutional mechanism should
therefore entail a significant
increase in transparency on the
part of the Commission and a sys-
tematic exposure of commitment
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20. Bruegel estimates.
Sample: decisions in
English published
between May 2004 and
December 2013 (42
decisions in total). Pages
are counted from the
page 1 to the
Commissioner’s
signature (eg: annexes
are excluded).
21. Council Regulation
1/2003, art. 9(1).
22. Wagner Von-Papp
(2012) has a milder but
similar proposal: for the
European Commission to
publish the details of the
theory of harm that led
to the preliminary
finding of an
infringement. Such a
decision should then be
challengeable before
court if erroneous as a
matter of law. 
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decisions to potential judicial
review. The most straightforward
way to obtain such an effect is to
legally require the Commission to
publish the details of its assess-
ments that result in commitment
decisions.
In cases that result in commit-
ment decisions,
Article 9 of Council
Regulation 1/2003
already appears to
imply the existence
of a specific
infringement (albeit
preliminarily identi-
fied). Commitments
are accepted where
there exists a need for “an
infringement to be brought to an
end”21. The article could be
amended to require the commit-
ment decision to spell out how
such an infringement has been
identified. The published commit-
ment decision could resemble a
non-confidential version of a
Statement of Objections22.
One major objection
to such a proposal
would be that com-
mitment decisions
come at a prelimi-
nary stage of the
Commission assess-
ment. Therefore the
Commission might
be reluctant to dis-
close the details of an
assessment that is still not
finalised. However, commitment
decisions introduce remedies on
the basis of the preliminary
assessment with concrete conse-
quences for markets. Therefore,
de facto, commitment decisions
imply the acceptance of the
infringement, except that no ex-
post judicial reviews currently
take place. 
Moreover, if the defendant is not
coerced or ‘bluffed’ into the com-
mitments and is given the tools to
fully assess the strength of the
Commission’s objections (includ-
ing full access to the
Commission’s file – see Wils,
2008, for a detailed discussion),
one could safely assume that the
defendant's voluntary offering of
commitments fairly complements
the information considered during
the preliminary assessment, miti-
gating the need for further
investigation.
This proposed amendment to the
Regulation would nevertheless
reduce the incentives for the
Commission and the parties
under investigation to converge
on a commitment decision. Both
parties would find commitment
decisions less appealing,
because the decision would natu-
rally be more exposed to judicial
review (particularly by third par-
ties, which would
have the informa-
tion needed to
challenge the sub-
stance of the
Commission’s deci-
sion) and
defendants would
be exposed to
potential damage
claims. However, the proposal
would not eliminate the incentive
for the Commission and the
defendant to settle. The major
benefits of commitment deci-
sions would be retained: for the
Commission, the procedure could
still be faster than for prohibition
decisions, and remedies would be
put in place earlier to restore the
‘There should be
more transparency
and exposure of com-
mitment decisions to
potential judicial
review.’
‘Commitment deci-
sions do not spell out
the full detail of the
theory of harm, and
allegations are not
analysed in depth.’
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correct functioning of the market.
Likewise, the defendant would be
spared a fine and would save on
legal expenses.
An increase in the transparency of
commitment decisions would
establish a balance between
incentives: weak cases should be
dropped, while commitment deci-
sions should be based on
priority on the competition policy
agenda of the forthcoming new EU
administration. 
Excellent research assistance by
Silvia Carrieri is gratefully
acknowledged. The author wishes
to thank Matt Dann, Stephen
Gardner and Guntram Wolff for
helpful comments.
arguments and evidence that are
solid enough to provide clear
guidance to markets on the appli-
cation of competition law. Given
the importance that commitment
decisions have assumed in
antitrust proceedings, their impact
on consumers and markets is sub-
stantial and a consideration of
how they can be improved is nec-
essary. This should be a top
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